The existence of a phenomenon of legal pluralism is by now entirely beyond dispute; the literature related to this phenomenon having experienced something of a boom in the last 30 years, it can hardly be ignored. This indisputable finding allows one to make the following statement: "legal pluralism is a fact" (Griffiths 1986; Tamanaha 2008) .
What has been somewhat more difficult to agree upon is a precise definition of legal pluralism; therefore, we will provide a juxtaposition of selected definitions to be found in the literature as a way of drawing some initial inferences to help set our course: [. . .] is an attribute of a social field and not of a "law" or of a "legal system". A descriptive theory of legal pluralism deals with the fact that within any given field, law of various provenances may be operative. It is when in a social field more than one source of 'law", more than one "legal order", is observable, that the order of that field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism.
(Griffiths If we ask what can be learned from this juxtaposition of three different definitions, three points emerge. Firstly, at least for the purposes of our further inquiries, we should not be speaking as much about legal pluralism as about normative pluralism; this is the case because we are not speaking about the coexistence of multiple state or semistate legal systems, but rather about normative orders with different provenances: customary law, religious law, state law. Secondly, it is also clear that normative orders are -this will also become clear herealways orders belonging to specific communities -or as formulated from the governance perspective -to specific governance collectives. Governance collectives are also, as the sociology of law teaches us, always regulatory collectives: they set up rules for themselves in order to stabilize their internal order and at the same time to demarcate themselves from other collectives. The religious governance collective is the best example of this. Finally, a third inference that can be made from these definitions is that community-based orders also develop provisions and institutional mechanisms to enforce their normative order on the members of their community, because not to do so would risk jeopardizing their internal coherency and their demarcation from the external.
The chapters in this volume show that this is just how it works: the countries they describe not only have coexistent pluralities of normative orders, but also have a plurality of jurisdictional regimes and -what is particularly important -a plurality of jurisdictional cultures.
If things work this way, three implications follow in turn. Firstly, it makes sense to ascertain the various advantages and disadvantages associated with different institutional solutions for the problem of enforcing norms. From the perspective of institutional theory, this means, for example, inquiring into the specific institutional competency of, say, customary courts versus state courts, and to also raise the question about the extent to which conflict resolution by means of forms of traditional justice may, for its part, contribute to the enforcement of rule-of-law" principles. These considerations can be found in Brian Z. Tamanaha's chapter in this volume (Tamanaha
